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Abstract
We extend previous work that analyzes the stability of dynamics on probability distri-
butions over continuous strategy spaces. The stability concept considered is that of con-
vergence to the equilibrium distribution in the strong topology for all initial distributions
whose support is close to this equilibrium. Stability criteria involving strategy domination
and local superiority are developed for equilibrium distributions that are monomorphic
(i.e. the equilibrium consists of a single strategy) and for equilibrium distributions that
have ﬁnite support.
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Dynamic Stability of the Replicator Equation
with
Continuous Strategy Space
Ross Cressman
1 Introduction
Evolutionary dynamics for continuous strategy spaces have received considerable recent
attention both among theoretical biologists who are interested in the coevolution of species
traits and among economists who concentrate instead on predicting rational behavior of in-
dividuals whose payoﬀs are given through game interactions. Most theoretical research on
dynamic stability for coevolutionary models (e.g. Abrams, 2001; Doebeli and Dieckmann,
2000; Marrow et al., 1996 and the references therein) make the simplifying assumption each
species is monomorphic (or homogeneous) and remains so during the course of evolution
(i.e. all individuals present in a given species exhibit the same behavior).1 This leads to
the stability analysis of what are known as adaptive or strategy dynamics. Although there
has been much less research in this area from the economic or game-theoretic perspective
(e.g. Bomze, 1990, 1991; Seymour, 2000; Oechssler and Riedel, 2001, 2002), this literature
typically considers the full dynamical system where aggregate behavior is described by a
distribution on the space S of individual strategy choices and assume individual payoﬀs
are deﬁned in terms of a function f on S × S.
In this paper, we follow the latter approach applied to a symmetric game with a
continuous strategy space.2 These references in the economic literature spend a great deal
of time developing the evolutionary dynamic on the set of probability distributions (e.g.
the replicator dynamic), proving its solutions are well-deﬁned, and relating its properties
to static equilibrium conditions (that generalize those for the case where there are a ﬁnite
set of strategies that may be used by the population as in the matrix games of Section 2.1).
We beneﬁt from their work by brieﬂy summarizing this development at the beginning of
Section 2 and devoting the remainder of the paper to analyzing the dynamic stability of
equilibrium distributions for the replicator dynamic.
Immediate issues that arise in this dynamic analysis are what constitutes closeness
and/or convergence for probability distributions and for what initial distributions we ex-
pect this convergence. The main problem is that there are several ways to deﬁne these
topological concepts that generalize the accepted approach when there are a ﬁnite set of
strategies. Moreover, as clearly demonstrated by Oechssler and Riedel (2002), the conclu-
sions related to dynamic stability depend critically on which deﬁnitions are taken. These
issues are clariﬁed in Section 2.1 by referring to well-known dynamic stability results for
matrix games and, in the process, motivate our dynamic stability concept (at the beginning
of Section 3).
1Notable exceptions are Vincent et al. (1996) and Cressman and Garay (2003) where the eﬀects of
varying population size are also taken into account.
2In biological terms, we are then studying single-species coevolutionary models.
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Our main goal is to derive conditions on f that predict dynamic stability. Section 3 then
completely characterizes (Theorems 1 and 2) dynamic stability of equilibrium distributions
concentrated at a single strategy and relates these results to the coevolutionary literature
for monomorphic populations (Remark 1). Section 4 extends these results to equilibrium
distributions with ﬁnite support, giving suﬃcient conditions for dynamic stability (The-
orems 3 and 4). Section 5 summarizes the methods and discusses their application from
the economic perspective.
2 The Model
Evolutionary games with an arbitrary strategy space and their corresponding replicator
dynamics have been developed by a number of researchers over the past ﬁfteen years. Here
we brieﬂy summarize this development as it applies to our model. In general, individuals
are assumed to play a strategy in the set S and the population state is given by a prob-
ability measure P with respect to a measure space (S,B). If B ∈ B, P (B) is interpreted
as the proportion of individuals in the population who are using strategies in the set B.
For a given s ∈ S, δs denotes the Dirac delta measure that assigns unit mass to {s}. Let
π(s, P ) = π(δs, P ) denote the expected payoﬀ to an individual using strategy s when the
population is in state P . The mean payoﬀ to a random individual in the population with
state P is then π(P, P ) ≡
∫
S
π(δs, P )P (ds).
For us, S will be a nonempty compact subset of Rn and B will be the Borel subsets
of S (i.e. the σ−algebra of the Borel sets of Rn intersected with S and so P is a Borel
measure). Let ∆(S) denote the set of Borel probability measures with respect to (S,B).
Since P is a Borel measure, there is a unique closed subset of S, called the support of
P , such that the measure of its complement is 0 but every open set that intersects it has
positive measure (Royden, 1988). We will be most interested in the situation where the
payoﬀ function π(s, P ) is given through a continuous real-valued function f : S×S −→ R
by π(s, P ) =
∫
S f(s, y)P (dy). Unless otherwise stated, we will assume the existence of
such an f for the remainder of the paper. In particular, standard symmetric evolutionary
games that assume random pairwise interactions may be put in this form.3
We assume the replicator dynamic (1) describes how the population state evolves (i.e.
its solutions deﬁne trajectories P (t) in ∆(S)).
dP
dt
(B) =
∫
B
(π(δs, P )− π(P, P ))P (ds) (1)
Heuristically, this dynamic increases the probability of those sets of strategies B that have
a higher expected payoﬀ than the mean payoﬀ to a random individual in the population. It
has been shown (Oechssler and Riedel, 2001) that there is a unique solution that satisﬁes
this dynamic for all positive t given any initial probability measure P (0) with compact
support when f is continuous. Here B is a Borel subset of S and dPdt (B) at time t is
deﬁned to be limh→0
P (t+h)−P (t)
h (B) with respect to the variational norm (see (4) below).
Furthermore, the support of P (t) is the same as P (0) for all t ≥ 0. A population state P ∗
is an equilibrium of (1) if and only if π(δs, P
∗)− π(P ∗, P ∗) = 0 for all s ∈supp(P ∗).
3In fact, Bomze and Po¨tscher (1989) argue that the existence of such an f means the evolutionary game
can be interpreted as being based on pairwise interactions. It is only the form of pi(s, P ) that is important
to us, not whether players are competing pairwise.
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The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the dynamic stability of an equilibrium
state P ∗. Heuristically, dynamic stability of P ∗ refers to the question of whether P (t)
stays close and/or evolves to P ∗ if the initial P (0) is chosen appropriately in ∆(S). From
Oechssler and Riedel (2002), it is clear that the answers to the stability question depend
critically on the concept of closeness of probability measures (i.e. on the topology used
for the space of Borel probability measures), especially when the strategy space is not a
discrete subset of Rn. We will return to this issue after the following section that begins
with a ﬁnite strategy space.
2.1 Matrix Games
Standard matrix games emerge when there are a ﬁnite number of possible strategies in-
dividuals may use. If there are m such strategies, they are often thought of as “pure
strategies” and then identiﬁed with the unit coordinate vectors ei = (0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0) in
Rm that have 1 in the ith component and 0 everywhere else. In our notation, P (0) then
has ﬁnite support contained in {e1, ..., em} = S where S is now a subset of R
m. Then
P (t) =
∑m
i=1 pi(t)δei where pi(t) is the proportion (or frequency) of individuals in the
population using strategy ei at time t. From (1), the replicator equation becomes
p˙i = pi
⎛
⎝ m∑
k=1
f(ei, ek)pk −
m∑
j,k=1
f(ej, ek)pjpk
⎞
⎠ .
This dynamic can be rewritten in matrix form where A is the m ×m payoﬀ matrix
with entries Aij = f(ei, ej) as
p˙i = pi (ei − p) ·Ap. (2)
Here u · Av is the standard inner product of column vectors u and Av in Rm (i.e. u ·
Av =
∑m
j,k=1 ujAjkvk) and p is the frequency vector in the m − 1 dimensional simplex
∆m = {(p1, ..., pm) |
∑
pi = 1, pi ≥ 0}. Since there is a 1 − 1 correspondence between
∆(S) and ∆m, dynamic stability of P ∗ becomes the stability of p∗ ∈ ∆m with respect
to the dynamical system (2) on ∆m. It is well known that a “matrix” ESS4 is a locally
asymptotically stable equilibrium of (2) and that the converse is not true for all matrix
games when there are more than two pure strategies (i.e. m ≥ 2).
The matrix ESS concept may be developed through conditions of dynamic stability of a
strategy p∗ when invaded by a mutant strategy q. This involves the extension of the above
“pure-strategy” matrix game to the so-called “mixed strategy” model with a continuous
strategy space. For a matrix game with m pure strategies and m×m payoﬀ matrix A, an
individual is now allowed to play a mixed strategy q ∈ ∆m where qi is then interpreted as
the probability this individual will play strategy ei in a given contest. Thus S becomes
all of ∆m and P is a Borel probability measure on this continuous strategy space. Let
p ∈ ∆m be the mean strategy
∫
∆m qP (dq) of the population state P . In this mixed
strategy model, it is assumed that π(ei, P ) =
∑
k Aikpk and that π(q, P ) =
∑
i qiπ(ei, P ).
4Since the term ESS is overused in the literature, it may have several meanings for some readers. We
restrict its use in this paper to that of an evolutionarily stable strategy p∗ ∈ ∆m of an m×m payoﬀ matrix
A (hence a “matrix” ESS) as developed by Maynard Smith (1982) where there is one universally accepted
meaning. Such a p∗ is deﬁned to be a Nash equilibrium (i.e. it satisﬁes p ·Ap∗ ≤ p∗ ·Ap∗ for all p ∈ ∆m)
that also fulﬁlls the stability condition p ·Ap < p∗ ·Ap whenever p ·Ap∗ = p∗ ·Ap∗ and p = p∗. This ESS
concept is then equvalent to the requirement that p ·Ap < p∗ ·Ap for all p ∈ ∆m suﬃciently close (but not
equal) to p∗ (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Cressman, 2003).
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In particular, individual payoﬀs depend linearly on both the mean population state and
on the components of the individual’s mean strategy.
To analyze stability in our nonlinear models, it is instructive to consider it ﬁrst in this
mixed strategy model when p∗ is invaded by a mutant strategy q. To this end, suppose
that p∗ is an ESS of the payoﬀ matrix A and q is some other mixed strategy suﬃciently
close to p∗. If supp(P (0)) = {p∗, q} then the mixed strategy replicator dynamic that
results from (1) is
dP
dt
({p∗}) = P ({p∗}) (p∗ − p) · Ap
where p = P ({p∗})p∗+P ({q})q. Since p is on the line segment from q to p∗ (in particular,
p is closer to p∗ than q is) and p∗ is a matrix ESS, dPdt ({p
∗}) > 0 for all 0 < P ({p∗}) < 1.
Thus p∗ is globally asymptotically stable.5
In fact, p∗ is a matrix ESS if and only if p∗ is globally asymptotically stable for all these
two-strategy dynamics with supp(P (0)) = {p∗, q} and q suﬃciently close (but not equal)
to p∗ (Cressman, 1992). It is the generalization of this result to non-matrix symmetric
games that motivates our dynamic stability concept introduced in the following section.
We will also need to refer to the general mixed-strategy matrix game model with
arbitrary P (0). Here, the replicator dynamic (1) becomes
dP
dt
(B) =
∫
B
(q − p) · ApP (dq). (3)
Akin (1982) shows that the evolution of the strategy distribution P (t) is completely de-
termined by the initial distribution P (0) and the evolution of the mean strategy p(t). In
particular, p converges to an ESS p∗ whenever p∗ is in the convex hull of supp(P (0)) and
supp(P (0)) is suﬃciently close to p∗.
3 Stability of Monomorphic Populations
Our concept of dynamic stability requires a topological notion of closeness on the set of
probability measures. There are several topologies on ∆(S) that are all equivalent to the
Euclidean topology on ∆m when S is a ﬁnite set with m strategies. The most important
for us is the strong topology based on the variational norm (Bomze, 1990, 1991; Oechssler
and Riedel, 2001) deﬁned by
‖ P −Q ‖≡ 2 sup
B∈B
| P (B) −Q(B) | (4)
for P,Q ∈ ∆(S). That is, an open set in the strong topology is one for which every P in
it contains a ball of positive radius with respect to this norm centred at P .
If Q in (4) is the monomorphic population δs where all individuals in the population
use the same strategy s, then
‖ P − δs ‖≡ 2max
{
sup
s∈B
| P (B)− 1 |, sup
s/∈B
P (B)
}
= 2max{| P ({s})− 1 |, P (S\{s})}
= 2(1− P ({s})).
5This is a slight abuse of notation that should not cause the readers undue confusion. Formally, in
terms of the measure P , P ({p∗}) monotonically increases to 1 (as P ({q}) decreases to 0) and so P (t)
evolves to δp∗ in the strong topology (see Section 3) under (1).
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Thus, P (t) evolves to δs in the strong topology if and only if P ({s}) converges to 1. By
default, every δs is an equilibrium of (1). The question in this section then becomes which,
if any, s∗ ∈ S corresponds to a dynamically stable equilibrium δs∗ of (1).
Generalizing the result for the matrix game model of Section 2.1 when p∗ is invaded
by a mutant strategy q, our dynamic stability concept requires P (t) to converge to δs∗ in
the strong topology if supp(P (0)) = {s∗, s} for all s suﬃciently close (but not equal) to
s∗. In biological terms, the monomorphic population δs∗ resists invasion by any mutant
strategy s suﬃciently close to s∗ (whether this mutant is rare or not). From Section 2,
π(δs∗ , P ) = f(s
∗, s∗)P ({s∗}) + f(s∗, s)P ({s}), π(δs, P ) = f(s, s
∗)P ({s∗}) + f(s, s)P ({s})
and π(P, P ) = P ({s∗})π(δs∗, P ) + P ({s})π(δs, P ). Thus
dP
dt
({s∗}) = P ({s∗})P ({s}) [(f(s∗, s∗)− f(s, s∗))P ({s∗}) + (f(s∗, s)− f(s, s))P ({s})]
and so dPdt ({s
∗}) > 0 for all 0 < P ({s∗}) < 1 if and only if
f(s∗, s∗) ≥ f(s, s∗) and f(s∗, s) ≥ f(s, s) (5)
with strict inequality in at least one of these for all s suﬃciently close (but not equal) to
s∗. These inequalities state that, for all s suﬃciently close (but not equal) to s∗, s∗ weakly
dominates s in the two-strategy game between s∗ and s with payoﬀ matrix
A =
[
f(s∗, s∗) f(s∗, s)
f(s, s∗) f(s, s)
]
.
The above discussion proves the result summarized in the following statement.
Suppose s∗ weakly dominates s in the two-strategy game between s∗ and s for all s
suﬃciently close (but not equal) to s∗. Then, for all such s, P (t) converges to δs∗ in the
strong topology if supp(P (0)) = {s∗, s}. The converse is also true.
Theorem 3 is the analogue of the matrix ESS concept developed as a strategy that
resists invasion by a mutant. As noted at the end of Section 2.1, a matrix ESS p∗ is also
related to dynamic stability in the mixed-strategy matrix game model. The corresponding
question here becomes how the conditions of Theorem 1 relate to dynamic stability of the
measure-theoretic replicator equation (1). In the remainder of this section, we consider
dynamic stability of a homogeneous population s∗ in the interior of the strategy space S.
To begin with, we require any initial P (0), with supp(P (0)) suﬃciently close to s∗ and
P ({s∗}) > 0 initially, to converge to δs∗ in the strong topology.
6 Weak domination is no
longer suﬃcient in general (although it remains a necessary condition since the converse
of Theorem 3 must still hold). To see this, consider the mixed-strategy matrix model
with supp(P (0)) = {p∗, p∗ + ǫ(p − p∗), p∗ − ǫ(p − p∗)} and p∗ an ESS of A. Then p = p∗
whenever P ({p∗ + ǫ(p − p∗)}) = P ({p∗ − ǫ(p − p∗)})˙ and ǫ is a small nonzero number
with p∗ ± ǫ(p − p∗) ∈ ∆m. Thus, every such state with ǫ small is a rest point of the
replicator dynamic and so P (t) does not converge to δp∗ . At best δp∗ may be neutrally
stable; although, in this mixed strategy model the population mean strategy does converge
to p∗ (see (3)).
To avoid this type of neutral stability, let us assume that, for all s suﬃciently close
(but not equal) to s∗, s∗ strongly dominates s in the two-strategy game between s∗ and
s. That is, for all such s,
f(s∗, s∗) > f(s, s∗)
f(s∗, s) > f(s, s).
(6)
6In measure theory, a measure P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q if, for all B ∈ B, P (B) > 0
implies Q(B) > 0. Thus, the assumption P ({s∗}) > 0 states that δs∗ is absolutely continuous with respect
to P as a measure.
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In particular, from the ﬁrst inequality, s∗ is locally a strict NE. For technical reasons (see
Remark 1 below), we will also assume that this domination is determined by the second
order Taylor expansion of f(x, y) and that s∗ is in the interior of S. In particular, the
function f(x, y) has continuous partial derivatives up to second order. For example, when
S is a subset of R, the Taylor expansion is
f(s, y) = f(s∗, s∗) + f1 (s− s
∗) + f2 (y − s
∗) (7)
+
1
2
[
f11 (s− s
∗)2 + 2f12 (s− s
∗) (y − s∗) + f22 (y − s
∗)2 + h.o.t.
]
where f1 is the ﬁrst order partial derivative of f(x, y) evaluated at (s
∗, s∗) with respect to
the ﬁrst variable, etc. Since s∗ is in the interior of S, f1 = 0. By ignoring the higher order
terms, the two inequalities in (6) become
f11 < 0 and f11 + 2f12 < 0 (8)
respectively.
With these assumptions, we then have the following result.
Suppose s∗ is in the interior of S ⊂ Rn and that domination in the two-strategy game
between s∗ and s for all s suﬃciently close (but not equal) to s∗ is determined by the
second order Taylor expansion of f(x, y) about x = y = s∗. If P ({s∗}) > 0 initially,
supp(P (0)) is suﬃciently close to s∗ and s∗ satisﬁes (6) for all s in a neighborhood of s∗,
then P (t) converges to δs∗ in the strong topology.
Proof. We restrict the proof here to the case of a one dimensional strategy space (i.e. S
is a compact subset of R). The general proof is in the Appendix. From (1),
dP
dt
({s∗}) = P ({s∗}) (π(δs∗, P )− π(P, P ))
= P ({s∗})
(∫
S
f(s∗, y)P (dy)−
∫
S
∫
S
f(s, y)P (dy)P (ds)
)
= P ({s∗})
∫
S
∫
S
(f(s∗, y)− f(s, y))P (dy)P (ds).
From (7),
f(s∗, y)− f(s, y) = −
1
2
f11 (s− s
∗)2 − f12 (s− s
∗) (y − s∗) + h.o.t.
∼= −
1
2
[
f11
(
(s− s∗)2 − (s− s∗) (y − s∗)
)
+ (f11 + 2f12) (s− s
∗) (y − s∗)
]
.
Now
∫
S
∫
S
(
(s− s∗)2 − (s− s∗) (y − s∗)
)
P (dy)P (ds) =
∫
S(s − s)
2P (ds) where s =∫
S sP (ds) is the mean strategy of the population and∫
S
∫
S (s− s
∗) (y − s∗)P (dy)P (ds) = (s− s∗)2. Thus, from (8),
∫
S
∫
S
(f(s∗, y)− f(s, y))P (dy)P (ds) ∼= −
1
2
[
f11
(∫
S
(s− s)2P (ds)
)
+ (f11 + 2f12) (s− s
∗)2
]
≥ 0
with strict inequality whenever supp(P ) is suﬃciently close to s∗, unless s = s∗ and P = δs.
Since P ({s∗}) > 0, dPdt ({s
∗}) > 0 unless P = δs∗ if supp(P (0)) is suﬃciently close to s
∗.
Thus P ({s∗}) converges to 1.
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By Theorem 3, if P (t) converges to δs∗ in the strong topology for all initial P (0) with
support suﬃciently close to s∗ and P ({s∗}) > 0, then s∗ weakly dominates in the two-
strategy game between s∗ and s for all s suﬃciently close (but not equal) to s∗. This gives
a partial converse of Theorem 3. In the special case when there are no terms higher than
quadratic in the Taylor expansion of f(x, y), the proof of Theorem 3 immediately shows
the following result on global convergence.
If f(x, y) is a quadratic polynomial and s∗ strongly dominates s in the two-strategy
game between s∗ and s for all s suﬃciently close (but not equal) to s∗, then P (t) converges
to δs∗ in the strong topology whenever s
∗ is in the interior of S ⊂ Rn and P ({s∗}) > 0.
The negativity conditions on f11 and f11 + 2f12 in (8), that follow from the Taylor
expansion of (6) when S is one dimensional, have received considerable attention in the
coevolutionary literature. The ﬁrst is often called the ESS criterion for s∗ when the payoﬀ
function is nonlinear in its ﬁrst variable since it implies that a monomorphic population
s∗ cannot be invaded by a rare mutant strategy s, paralleling the intuition developed by
Maynard Smith (1982). However, as remarked earlier, this term is potentially ambiguous
and so the phrase “local strict NE” is preferred.
The second negativity condition is that s∗ is a NIS (neighborhood invader strategy)
(McKelvey and Apaloo, 1995; Apaloo, 1997). It is interesting to note that together these
two inequalities imply that f11 + f12 < 0, which is one of the early criteria (Eshel, 1983)
for stability of homogeneous populations called CSS (continuously stable strategy).
Situations where the Taylor expansion is not valid have also been considered. For
example, Seymour (2000) has strengthened the strictness concept to that of a super-strict
NE whereby, for some ε > 0, f(s∗, s∗) > f(s, s∗) + ε whenever s = s∗. In particular, f
is not continuous in its ﬁrst variable. However, if f is still continuous in its second ﬁrst
variable, f(s∗, y) − f(s, y) > 0 for all (s, y) suﬃciently close (but not equal) to (s∗, s∗)
with s diﬀerent than s∗. The above method of proof then shows Theorem 3 remains valid
in these circumstances, a result that also follows from Seymour’s analysis.
Theorems 3 and 3 cannot be extended to initial P (0) that have most of their support
near s∗. To see this, consider the following example taken from Oechssler and Riedel (2002)
who considered only one dimensional continuous strategy spaces. Let f(x, y) = −x2+x2y2.
It is straightforward to conﬁrm that s∗ = 0 strongly dominates s in the two-strategy game
between s∗ and s for all 0 <| s |< 1. However, dPdt ({s
∗}) < 0 if supp(P (0)) = {s∗, s}
and P ({s})s4 − s2 > 0, and so P (t) does not converge to δs∗ in the strong topology for
all initial P (0) if | s |> 1. The problem here is that initial states can be close to δs∗ in
the strong topology without the Hausdorﬀ distance (see Section 4 below) between their
compact supports being small.
This problem led Oechssler and Riedel (2002) to consider other topologies7 on the set of
probability measures and introduce other stronger static conditions that potentially imply
dynamic stability with respect to this topology. Their most promising static concept (see
evolutionary robustness at the end of Section 4) is based on intuitive dynamic stability
for initial P (0) that allow for “both a large change of strategic play by a small fraction of
players as well as a small change of strategic play by a large fraction of the population”
(which is an informal description of the weak topology). Unfortunately, they were unable
to prove a general dynamic stability result which gives a main impetus for the approach
adopted in this paper.
7Speciﬁcally, they consider the weak topology whereby P (t) converges to P in the weak topology if∫
S
g(s)dP (t)(s) converges to
∫
S
g(s)dP (s) for all continuous functions g on S. Then P (t) converging to P
in the strong topology implies weak convergence but not conversely.
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Oechssler and Riedel (2002) also provide an example to show that the local strict NE
condition, f11 < 0, is not suﬃcient for even “local” dynamic stability with respect to
the weak topology when there is a continuous strategy space. Speciﬁcally, with f(x, y)
the quadratic polynomial −x2 + 4xy, δs∗ with s
∗ = 0 is a local strict NE but nearby
(with respect to the weak topology) initial distributions P (0) do not converge to δs∗ . This
contrasts to the situation for ﬁnite strategy spaces where the local asymptotic stability of
a (local) strict NE is one of the main results of the Folk Theorem of Evolutionary Game
Theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Cressman, 2003).
4 Stability of Dimorphic Populations
In contrast to the study of stability for monomorphic populations P ∗ = δs∗ , very little
research has been done that analyzes the dynamic stability of a general equilibrium of
the replicator dynamic. Although the main result (Theorem 4 below) applies to all P ∗
with ﬁnite support, we concentrate here on the most elementary extension; namely, when
supp(P ∗) has two strategies {s∗, r∗} (hence, a dimorphism). To generalize Theorem 3, we
want conditions for which P (t) converges to P ∗ in the strong topology if P ({s∗})P ({r∗}) >
0 initially and supp(P (0)) is suﬃciently close to {s∗, r∗}.8
In particular, when supp(P (0)) = {s∗, r∗}, P ∗ must be globally asymptotically stable
for the one-dimensional replicator dynamic which is
dP
dt
({s∗}) = P ({s∗})P ({r∗}) [(f(s∗, s∗)− f(s∗, r∗))P ({s∗}) + (f(r∗, s∗)− f(r∗, r∗))P ({r∗})] .
from (1). This is the replicator dynamic for the two-strategy matrix game with payoﬀ
matrix
A =
[
f(s∗, s∗) f(s∗, r∗)
f(r∗, s∗) f(r∗, r∗)
]
.
It is well-known there is an interior equilibrium (p∗1, p
∗
2) = (P ({s
∗}), P ({t∗})) given by
p∗1 =
f(s∗, r∗)− f(r∗, r∗)
f(s∗, r∗)− f(r∗, r∗) + f(r∗, s∗)− f(s∗, s∗)
p∗2 =
f(r∗, s∗)− f(s∗, s∗)
f(s∗, r∗)− f(r∗, r∗) + f(r∗, s∗)− f(s∗, s∗)
if and only if (f(s∗, r∗)− f(r∗, r∗)) (f(r∗, s∗)− f(s∗, s∗)) > 0. Moreover, (p∗1, p
∗
2) is globally
asymptotically stable if and only if f(s∗, r∗) > f(r∗, r∗) and f(r∗, s∗) > f(s∗, s∗). These
inequalities, which we assume are valid throughout the remainder of this section, assert
(p∗1, p
∗
2) is the unique ESS of the 2× 2 payoﬀ matrix A.
Suppose this dimorphism is invaded by a mutant strategy s near s∗ or r∗. The replicator
dynamic is now with respect to the 3× 3 payoﬀ matrix
⎡
⎣ f(s
∗, s∗) f(s∗, r∗) f(s∗, s)
f(r∗, s∗) f(r∗, r∗) f(r∗, s)
f(s, s∗) f(s, r∗) f(s, s)
⎤
⎦ . (9)
8We take the Hausdorﬀ distance (Gulick, 1992) as a measure of closeness between two com-
pact sets. Since {s∗, r∗} is contained in supp(P (0)), the Hausdorﬀ distance between these sets is
maxs∈supp(P(0)) (min{| s − s
∗ |, | s− r∗ |}). For the homogeneous equilibria of Section 3, the Hausdorﬀ
distance between the supports of P (0) and δs∗ is maxs∈supp(P(0)){| s− s
∗ |}.
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Conditions for local asymptotic stability of (p∗1, p
∗
2, 0) are reasonably well understood. For
example, we need that the invading strategy has no higher payoﬀ than the two resi-
dent strategies at equilibrium (i.e. p∗1f(s, s
∗) + p∗2f(s, r
∗) ≤ p∗1f(s
∗, s∗) + p∗2f(s
∗, r∗) =
p∗1f(r
∗, s∗) + p∗2f(r
∗, r∗)). We will in fact assume p∗1f(s, s
∗) + p∗2f(s, r
∗) = p∗1f(s
∗, s∗) +
p∗2f(s
∗, r∗) if s /∈ {s∗, r∗} to avoid technical complications.9 Then, (p∗1, p
∗
2, 0) is locally
asymptotically stable if and only if
p∗1f(s, s
∗) + p∗2f(s, r
∗) < p∗1f(s
∗, s∗) + p∗2f(s
∗, r∗) = p∗1f(r
∗, s∗) + p∗2f(r
∗, r∗). (10)
These conditions state that (p∗1, p
∗
2, 0) is a local quasi-strict NE (i.e. a quasi-strict NE of
(9) for all s near s∗ or r∗) and correspond to the ﬁrst inequality in (6)
The inequality condition in (10) is also the frequency version (Vincent and Cressman,
2000) of the ESS maximum principle for a coalition of two developed for coevolutionary
population dynamics by Vincent and co-workers (see, for example, Vincent et al. (1996)
and the references therein). We do not use this designation to avoid possible confusion
with the matrix ESS concept. Heuristically, the maximum principle states that the “ﬁt-
ness generating function” as a function of s, p∗1f(s, s
∗) + p∗2f(s, r
∗), corresponding to this
dynamic attains its local maximum value at precisely s∗ or r∗.
Conditions for global asymptotic stability of (p∗1, p
∗
2, 0) are not so precise. Here, we
concentrate on the following concept which implies global asymptotic stability of (p∗1, p
∗
2, 0)
by applying Theorem 4 below to the dimorphic case. At this point, it should also be
emphasized again that the following theory (especially Theorem 4) is developed for any
P ∗ with ﬁnite support and not only for the dimorphic (or monomorphic) model.
The probability measure P ∗ ∈ ∆(S) is locally superior if, for all other P with support
suﬃciently close to the support of P ∗, π(P ∗, P ) > π(P, P ).
Weibull (1995) deﬁned the concept of locally superior for matrix game models and
showed a p∗ ∈ ∆m is locally superior if and only if p∗ is a matrix ESS. His deﬁnition
(that π(p∗, p) > π(p, p) for all p suﬃciently close (but not equal) to p∗) is equivalent to
Deﬁnition 4 in the mixed strategy matrix model if we only consider those P for which the
mean strategy p is diﬀerent from that of P ∗ since π(P,Q) = π(p, q).
By appropriate choices of P , Deﬁnition 4 includes our development so far of stability
in the dimorphic model with supp(P ∗) = {s∗, r∗}. First, by taking supp(P ) = {s∗, r∗},
we ﬁnd local superiority implies that f(s∗, r∗) > f(r∗, r∗) and f(r∗, s∗) > f(s∗, s∗) (i.e.
(p∗1, p
∗
2) is globally asymptotically stable for the two-strategy game between s
∗ and r∗).
Also, if P is of the form (1 − ε)P ∗ + εδs for some 0 < ε < 1, local superiority implies
that P ∗ is a locally quasi-strict NE for the three-strategy game with payoﬀ matrix given
by (9). Moreover, when Deﬁnition 4 is applied to a monomorphic P ∗ = δs∗ , P
∗ is locally
superior if and only if s∗ strictly dominates s in the two person game between s and s∗
whenever s is suﬃciently close to s∗ and domination is determined by the second order
Taylor expansion of f(x, y). This is essentially what is proven in Theorem 3.
Suppose P ∗ is a locally superior probability measure with ﬁnite support. If supp(P (0))
is suﬃciently close to supp(P ∗) and P ({s∗}) > 0 initially for all s∗ ∈supp(P ∗), then P (t)
converges to P ∗ in the strong topology.
Proof. We only provide the proof for the case where supp(P ∗) = {s∗, r∗}. The gen-
eral proof follows analogously. Consider the function V : ∆(S) → R given by V (P ) ≡
P ({s∗})p
∗
1P ({r∗})p
∗
2. A straightforward calculation shows that, under the assumptions
in the statement of the theorem, 1V V˙ = π(P
∗, P ) − π(P, P ) > 0 if P = P ∗. Thus
9This assumption has the unfortunate consequence that our method is not directly applicable to the
mixed strategy matrix model of Section 2.1 since payoﬀ linearity there implies p∗1f(s, s
∗) + p∗2f(s, t
∗) =
p∗1f(s
∗, s∗) + p∗2f(s
∗, t∗) if s is on the line segment from s∗ to t∗.
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V (P ) is strictly increasing toward its unique maximum attained when P ({s∗}) = p∗1 and
P ({r∗}) = p∗2 (i.e. when P = P
∗). Since ‖ P − P ∗ ‖≡ 2max{1− P ({s∗, r∗}), P ∗({s∗})−
P ({s∗}), P ∗({r∗})− P ({r∗})} from (4), P converges to P ∗ in the strong topology.
Domination conditions may be used in place of local superiority to show P (t) converges
to P ∗ in the strong topology. However, we can no longer expect s∗ to dominate all
strategies in supp(P (0)) as in Theorems 3 and 3 since it does not dominate r∗ in the two-
strategy game between s∗ and r∗.10 Instead, we look for dominance of nearby strategies
as follows. Suppose supp(P ∗) = {s∗, r∗} and, in the game with strategy set supp(P (0)),
s∗ strictly dominates s for all other s near s∗ (i.e. f(s∗, y) > f(s, y) for all y ∈supp(P (0)))
and r∗ strictly dominates r for all other r near r∗. Then, if B is a compact set suﬃciently
close to and disjoint from s∗ with P (B) > 0,
d
dt
(
P (B)
P ({s∗})
)
=
P ({s∗})
∫
B (π(s, P )− π(P, P ))P (ds)− P ({s
∗}) (π(s∗, P )− π(P, P ))P (B)
(P ({s∗}))2
=
1
(P ({s∗}))2
∫
B
(π(s, P )− π(s∗, P ))P (ds)
=
1
(P ({s∗}))2
∫
B
∫
S
(f(s, y)− f(s∗, y))P (ds)P (dy)
< 0.
Thus
P (B)
P ({s∗}) is monotone decreasing and so P (B) must converge to 0. Similarly, P (C) con-
verges to 0 for all compact sets suﬃciently close to and disjoint from r∗. Thus P ({s∗, r∗})
converges to 1 and we already know that, for this two strategy game, we have convergence
to P ∗ in the strong topology. That is, we have shown the following result.
Suppose there are m strategies in the support of P ∗ and P ∗ is a globally asymptot-
ically stable equilibrium in the corresponding m−strategy game. Furthermore, suppose
supp(P ∗) is covered bym disjoint open sets each containing one element s∗ of this support
and s∗ strictly dominates every other nearby s in this cover (in the game whose strategy
set is the entire cover). If supp(P (0)) is suﬃciently close to supp(P ∗) and P ({s∗}) > 0
initially for all s∗ ∈supp(P ∗), then P (t) converges to P ∗ in the strong topology.
Theorem 4 demonstrates how diﬃcult it is to get dynamic stability results for monomor-
phic δs∗ if the supp(P (0)) is not restricted to be close to s
∗. In particular, by Theo-
rems 3 and 3, the assumptions of Theorem 4 also imply that each monomorphic δs∗ with
s∗ ∈supp(P ∗) is dynamically stable for all initial P (0) with support suﬃciently close to
s∗ and P ({s∗}) > 0. That is, a small perturbation far away from a dynamically stable δs∗
has the potential to destabilize the monomorphism. This led Oechssler and Riedel (2002)
to generalize Deﬁnition 4 by calling P ∗ evolutionarily robust if π(P ∗, P ) > π(P, P ) for all
other P suﬃciently close to P ∗ in the weak topology. They then proved an analogous
result to Theorem 4. However, as we have just argued, evolutionary robustness is a very
strong assumption that will be diﬃcult to satisfy for most interesting payoﬀ functions
(besides those that are linear as in the matrix game model).
10Furthermore, p∗1s
∗ + p∗2r
∗ does not dominate s∗ or r∗ either, so there is no elementary method to
conﬁrm
pi(P ∗, P )− pi(P,P ) =
∫
S
∫
S
(p∗1f(s
∗, y) + p∗2f(r
∗, y) − f(s, y))P (dy)P (ds)
is positive (i.e. P ∗ is locally superior).
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5 Conclusion
Predicting the behaviors of rational individuals involved in game interactions through
analyzing stable equilibria of evolutionary dynamics is a well-accepted approach (Weibull,
1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Cressman, 2003), especially when the game has a
ﬁnite number of strategies. When there is a continuous strategy space, conditions on the
game’s payoﬀs for dynamic stability are not so well known, perhaps because there is no
general consensus on what constitutes such stability. In this paper, we have taken the
concept to mean that all distributions (with respect to which P ∗ is absolutely continuous
in the sense of measure theory) with support close to the equilibrium distribution P ∗
converge to P ∗ in the strong topology.
From this perspective, Section 2 demonstrates that our concept is a natural extension of
the ﬁnite strategy model. Sections 3 and 4 then develop the stability conditions. Here it is
seen that conditions on f(x, y) for stability in terms of strategy domination (Theorems 3, 3
and 4) emerge naturally by considering ﬁnite strategy games contained in the continuous
model. These domination conditions (e.g.(8)) are relatively elementary inequalities to
conﬁrm for a given function f . On the other hand, the intuitive local superiority condition
of Theorem 4 is not as easy to verify but does have the potential to predict rational behavior
when the equilibrium does not have ﬁnite (or even discrete) support. For instance, the
candidate stable equilibrium P ∗ for the standard War of Attrition Game (Oechssler and
Riedel, 2001; Cressman, 2003) with continuous strategy space a compact interval has the
entire ﬁrst half of this interval contained in its support. Oechssler and Riedel [16] show
that this P ∗ is locally superior11 and are able to prove this implies convergence in the
weak topology.
The techniques developed in this paper are more directly applicable to an equilibrium
P ∗ with ﬁnite support. They are particularly relevant for the stability analysis of homo-
geneous populations, a topic closely connected to recent work on coevolutionary models
among theoretical biologists. This suggests that the emerging theory of evolutionary dy-
namics on continuous strategy spaces will continue the tradition of evolutionary game
theory that fosters corresponding models and methods in predicting behavior both of
human and of other species.
11They actually show global superiority.
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6 Appendix
Proof of the remainder of Theorem 3. From the assumptions that s∗ is in the
interior of S ⊂ Rn and that domination in the two-strategy game between s∗ and s for
all s suﬃciently close (but not equal) to s∗ is determined by the second order Taylor
expansion of f(x, y) about x = y = s∗, we have that the inequalities in (8) must hold
where the second-order partial derivatives are now in the direction from s∗ to s. The ﬁrst
inequality implies that
∑
i,j
∂2f(x, y)
∂xi∂xj
(si − s
∗
i )
(
sj − s
∗
j
)
< 0
for all s in a neighborhood of s∗ (here the second-order partial derivatives are evaluated
at (s∗, s∗)). That is, the n × n matrix with ij entry ∂
2f
∂xi∂xj
≡ fxixj (i.e. the matrix[
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
]
) is negative deﬁnite. Similarly, from the second inequality in (8), the n × n
matrix
[
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
+ ∂
2f
∂xi∂yj
+ ∂
2f
∂yi∂xj
]
is also negative deﬁnite.12
From the second order Taylor expansion,
∫
S
∫
S (f(s
∗, y)− f(s, y))P (dy)P (ds) is now
given by
−
1
2
⎡
⎣
∫
S
∫
S
∑
i,j fxixj
(
(si − s
∗
i )
(
sj − s
∗
j
)
− (si − s
∗
i )
(
yj − s
∗
j
))
P (dy)P (ds)
+
∫
S
∫
S
∑
i,j
(
fxixj + 2fxiyj
)
(si − s
∗
i )
(
yj − s
∗
j
)
P (dy)P (ds)
⎤
⎦
= −
1
2
⎡
⎣∫
S
∑
i,j
fxixj (si − si) (sj − sj)P (ds) +
∑
i,j
(
fxixj + fxiyj + fyixj
)
(si − s
∗
i )
(
sj − s
∗
j
)⎤⎦ .
Since
[
fxixj
]
is negative deﬁnite,
∫
S
∑
i,j fxixj (si − si) (sj − sj)P (ds) is negative unless
si = si for all i whenever si ∈supp(P ). Similarly, the negative deﬁniteness of
[
fxixj + fxiyj + fyixj
]
implies
∑
i,j
(
fxixj + fxiyj + fyixj
)
(si − s
∗
i )
(
sj − s
∗
j
)
is negative unless si = s
∗
i for all i.
The remainder of the proof follows as in the main text.
12The use of negative deﬁniteness in the proof is similar to the method used by Mesze´na et al. 2001 (see
also Bomze, 1990; Apaloo, 1997). where
∫
S
(si − si) (sj − sj)P (ds) give entries of the covariance of the
population mean strategy.
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